A definition is something fundamental, something that precedes the application of a logical model. Defining the monetary base, therefore, might seem to be no different in a deregulated than in a regulated monetary system.' However, the problem is to identify what kind of monetary system would exist in a deregulated world in order to know what institutional form the monetary base might assume. Without agreement about a monetary system, it is difficult to distinguish between expendable regulation and the indispensable legal framework of an unregulated market system. This is not a normative matter, but a positive question about what kinds of monetary arrangements a truly free market system would produce. According to Selgin and White (1 994), at least three strands of literature ... can be distinguished according to the different sorts of payment media each predicts would predominate under laissez faire ... ... a modern free banking literature that.. .proposes that an unregulated money and banking system would have a single distinct base money, possibly, but not necessarily a precious metal, and private-bank-issued monies in the traditional forms of banknotes and transferable deposits made redeemable in base money; a small but influential group of works that associate the competitive supply of money with parallel private fiat-type monies, that is, plural brands of noncommodity base money issued by private firms; related literatures known as the "new monetary economics" and the "legal restrictions theory" that envision competitive payments systems without any base money, with common media of exchange consisting entirely of claims, paying competitive rates of return, on banks or money market mutual funds.
One approach would be to jump into the middle of this apocalyptic tangle and define the monetary base along each strand, or along the "right" strand. This paper takes a more pedestrian approach. It addresses the question of how successive stages of piecemeal deregulation affect the construction of an empirical counterpart to the a priori definition of monetary base. The first step is where we are today in the United States--in the midst of effectively eliminating reserve requirement regulations. Future steps might ' Two matters of semantics: First, many people use the phrase "monetary base" to refer to the adjusted base. However, for present purposes, "monetary base" or simply "base" will always mean unadjusted; the adjusted base measures of St. Louis and the Board will be designated as "adjusted base" and "breakadjusted base," respectively. Second, I use the word "bank" to mean "depository financial institution." involve investigating the redefinitions needed to incorporate the effects of eliminating central bank clearing services and then eliminating central bank interbank-settlement services. All three steps would still fall short of the place where Selgin and White begin--the disestablishment of government-fiat currency.
The subject is largely institutional, focused as it is on the probable outcome of market competitors driving regulation out of business, and the probable effect of deregulation on the appropriate measure of the monetary base. The approach is to examine the economic implications of changes in the financial sector for the proper measure of the monetary base.
To explore these matters it is necessary to know what a monetary base is, how it is measured today, and what deregulation means. The first section of the paper considers these background questions. The next section investigates the already diminishing role of reserve requirements in the banking system, as the first of what seem to me to be plausible stages of deregulation. Two major conclusions emerge. First, as a simple matter of accuracy, the existing time series of the monetary base and its components needs to be tuned up to account for modern banking and central banking practices.
Second, as a matter of logic and institutional fact, the two publicly available data series measuring the adjusted monetary base are becoming obsolete because the role of reserve requirements in the banking system is d i m i n i~h i n~.~ Whether these assertions can be verified empirically, and, if so, what to do about it, are matters for future research.
The Concept of the Monetary Base
Karl Brunner seems to have coined the term "monetary base" no later than his 1961 article, "A Schema for the Supply Theory of Money." His intent there was to develop a supply function of money, starting from the microfoundation of an individual bank managing its cash position in the context of settling customers7 payments. The result was an aggregate theoretical relationship in which, as he summarized it, "[tlhe money stock is explained in terms of some component of the public's demand functions for currency and time deposits, the monetary base adjusted for the cumulated reserve liberations, the interbank deposit structure, and a specific component of the banks' demand for Federal Reserve Money" (italics added). That is7 the money stock was a function of the monetary base (adjusted for changes in the effective reserve requirement) and of certain demand factors determined by institutional practices, preferences, and market conditions. At about the time Brunner was writing, Gurley and Shaw (1960) coined the phrase "outside money" to fit a similar definition. As the phrase implies, their focus was on nonmarket control of the money-supply impulse of the monetary base. They specifically excluded from outside money any funds that the monetary authority loaned directly to banks. For the same concept, James Tobin (1961) used the more cumbersome name "net non-interest-bearing government debt." Distinguishing between gross and net monetary base sometimes has been a significant issue. In the United States, the difference arises from the discount window at which the Federal Reserve Banks will lend base money, essentially on demand in the very short run. As a result, the gross volume of the monetary base, while entirely high-powered, may not be entirely within the precise control of the monetary authority. (Friedman and Schwartz [1963] ; Boone [1944] ). The concept of high-powered money, with associated multiple expansion and contraction of bank deposits, was not new in 1936, however.
Tom Humphrey (1992) has traced the notion back another 110 years, through Initially, the Board's base had no adjustments for changes in levels of reserve requirements or methods of computation and maintenance, but as the months went by, footnotes appeared, containing data with which users might adjust for such changes. Degree of control has been another matter of interest in isolating an outside monetary impulse that is exogenous to, or determined independently of, market forces.
The Federal Reserve's willingness to lend means that the monetary base can be an endogenous variable. For example, as market interest rates rise relative to the discount rate, banks can be expected to overcome some of their bashfulness about being in debt to the authorities. This has suggested that only the nonborrowed base should be viewed as the exogenous variable, an indicator of the outside control exercised by the monetary authority.
I was an imperfectly informed participant-observer of the Federal Reserve System at that time, but my recollection is that the Board staffs apparent reluctance to produce a measure of the monetary base was more than sour grapes. True, there might have been some reaction to the success of the St. Louis research department in popularizing an implementable form of monetarism. However, the real reluctance was more a reflection of the Board's growing involvement in large-scale, aggregate econometric models of the economy and the application of control theory to the policy process. A single summary time series index of the money supply impulse simply was out of place in the more elegant system of demand and supply equations. 
Deregulation
The American economy teems with regulations. In searching for those regulations whose extinction would be relevant to the monetary base, it is helpful to differentiate between the Reserve Banks as sources of assets held by the banking and nonbanking public, and the reserve accounting regulatory framework that governs the uses of the base.
Interest in reconstructing the base comes on both fronts. New sources, for example, might come from the unregulated emergence of stored-value cards. Suppose that software providers, brokerage houses, or travel-and entertainment-card companies were to act as warehouses of funds stored on their branded cards but not yet spent at the many merchants who would accept them. Unless these warehouse facilities maintained 100 percent reserves in central-bank money, stored value might be considered another type of base money, fully commensurate with high-powered bank reserves. After all, they might be better than deposits at the Fed in being generally acceptable, and better than Federal Reserve notes in being electronically transferable in making anonymous payments.
However, concerns about deregulation are more often based on new uses. This is the realm in which the probability of movement toward a deregulated monetary system seems very high. Actually, this would be "further movement," for it would simply continue the trend toward deregulation that followed the regulatory high tide of the 1930s and World War 11.
Interest-rate controls are gone. The prohibition of interest on demand deposits remains on the books, but has been rendered largely ineffective by the long-standing banking practice of implicit interest payments on compensating balances and by the more recent introduction of sweep accounts and interest-bearing NOW accounts.
As to the future, consider the following: services, and fiscal agent--is more than conceivable; it is the default mode in which Reserve Banks already operate. Moreover, a good case can be made that erosion in any one of the four areas would increase the likelihood of erosion in the others. Therefore, it is productive to focus discussions of deregulation on stages in the process of statutory or competitive elimination of the bankers' banks.
Reserve Requirement Deregulation
Deregulation is worth thinking about because it has been happening and is likely to continue. One of its aspects has been the erosion of reserve requirements as a factor Surplus vault cash now amounts to about 10 percent of total vault cash. This is vault cash that is not applied to meeting reserve requirements by those banks that meet the entire requirement with vault cash.
Clearing balances at times have amounted to as much as 20 percent of banks' total deposits at Federal Reserve Banks. These are balances maintained in addition to required reserves to support operational needs. The Federal Reserve calls them "service-related balances" or "required clearing balances."
Banks use their surplus vault cash to meet operational needs during the day and at ATM machines at night. Investing the surplus overnight is either impossible or unprofitable. Clearing balances are a different story. Although readily available for overnight investment, they are not invested in the market. Instead, a bank contracts with a Reserve Bank to maintain a specified average overnight clearing balance during a reserve-maintenance period. This balance is not segregated in a unique account, but supplements whatever average reserve deposit balance the bank is required to maintain in a unified account over the same period. The result is a combined balance with a target level that the bank deliberately has set higher than reserve-requirement regulations specify.
A contractual clearing balance has two benefits for a bank. One is that the Reserve Bank pays interest on clearing balances--at the level of the federal funds rate--in the form of earnings credits a bank can use (instead of hard dollars) to pay for Reserve Bank services. This feature alone does not explain why banks would use this roundabout method to pay for services. Clearly, however, earnings credits do make a clearing balance more palatable.
The real benefit of a clearing balance is that it reduces the cost of operating in an uncertain transactions environment (Stevens, 1993a, b) . A bank doing a significant volume of business with its Reserve Bank could find it costly to target a zero overnight balance in its account, or a balance low enough to avoid wasting reserves. The Reserve Banks penalize overnight overdrafts and charge fees for excessive daylight overdrafts.
Uncertainty, however, prevents a bank from controlling its overnight balance precisely, and from predicting the intraday sequence of debits and credits to its a c~o u n t .~ The Until the mid-1980s, the intraday sequence of debits and credits was of little practical concern. The Reserve Banks had to permit unlimited daylight overdrafts because their deposit-accounting system made tracking intraday positions almost impossible. Over the past decade, however, the Reserve Banks have upgraded their accounting systems and now monitor the daylight overdrafts of each bank (ex post, in most cases) relative to a ceiling above which fees are assessed.
higher the positive overnight balance a bank targets, the less likely it is to exceed its daylight overdraft limit during the day, to be overdrawn at the close of business or forced into last-resort borrowing.
The American banking system is in the midst of a massive migration of banks from a regulatory to an operational demand for balances at the Reserve Banks. The large deposit balances demanded by high reserve requirements reduce the risk of daylight and overnight overdrafts. Meeting a very high reserve requirement may involve more than enough cash to cover operational needs. A low reserve requirement, on the other hand, can make a required reserve balance objective redundant. Maintaining an operational balance sufficient to ensure against overdrafts may involve more than enough cash to meet reserve requirements.
The growing significance of banks' operational demands for base money relative to the demands imposed by reserve requirements is consistent with the downward trend of required reserve ratios from their peak levels shortly after World War 11, before banks were allowed to use vault cash to satisfy requirements. Requirements today are both lower and less complex than in days past (table 1). In 1995, the required reserve ratio was zero on all of a bank's liabilities except transactions deposits in excess of $4.2 million, was only 3 percent on the next $50 million of transactions deposits, and only 10 percent on amounts above $54.2 m i l l i~n .~ Even among large depository institutions (the 7,500 that report data to the Fed weekly), 68 percent either operated below the $4.2 million floor or met their entire requirement with the cash they held at teller stations, in automated teller machines, and in their vaults (table 2). Another 20 percent had such low reserve requirements that they contracted to hold clearing balances in addition to the vault cash and deposits they needed to meet reserve requirements. Only about 900 banks, representing just 12 percent of those reporting weekly (but 38 percent of deposits at large banks), actually seemed to be constrained by reserve requirements. This relatively small group of banks met These dollar amounts are not fixed. Law requires that both the zero and the 3 percent ceilings be adjusted annually by 80 percent of the prior year percentage increase in total reservable liabilities of all depository institutions. requirements with vault cash and required reserve deposit balances, without apparent need for additional operating balances. In addition to the inclusion of balances used to meet requirements by carryover, measured excess reserves also include some nonreserve factors. This occurs because of the inclusion of the aggregate difference between each bank's actual and contractual clearing balance. Some of these difference are within the plus or minus 2 percent range that is a bank's allowable, penalty-free band for maintenance of its clearing balance.
Monetary-Base Data

Basic
While allowable as a clearing balance, this difference is included in aggregate excess reserves. A difference larger than plus or minus 2 percent is not allowable, being ' Banks contract to hold a specific amount of clearing balances over and above their required reserves during a reserve maintenance period. The reserve-accounting system defines required reserve balances as the difference between required reserves and predetermined applied vault cash. Actual reserve balances are defined as total balances (from the Reserve Banks' balance sheet), minus contractual clearing balances. Excess reserves are derived as the difference between actual and required reserve balances. The staff of the Board of Governors regularly prepares a report for internal use that uses these definitions and then prorates each bank's redundant position between reserve balances and clearing balances on the basis of the relative amounts of each deposit required.
indicator of the money-supply impulse, or thrust of policy. Yet this impulse or thrust is the defining reason for measuring the monetary base. At one time, the impact of changing a reserve ratio might have been limited to changes in the reserve constraint on the expansion of reservable deposits. Increasingly, however, the reserve requirement is not the operative constraint on the expansion of deposits.
Defining the Monetary Base
The possibility that reserve requirements are not a significant constraint for most of the country's large banks suggests the nature of the immediate problem with empirical representations of the monetary base: The base is intended to gauge the money-supply impulse, which comes from the supply of base money relative to its demand. It matters not whether demand is created by regulation through reserve requirements, or through business needs for operational balances--only that there be a demand. Of course, if there were no money-supply "kick" from changing reserve requirements, then the base adjustment would be inappropriate. And that is where the American banking system has been headed. If reducing reserve requirements induces banks to contract for larger clearing balances, then those extra clearing balances soak up some or all of the "kick" to the money supply. Reducing the required reserve ratio doesn't reduce the demand for balances; it merely changes their classification from "reserve" to "clearing." Under these circumstances, adjusting the monetary base for "cumulated reserve liberations" will not provide a better gauge of a money-supply impulse.
A perpetual downward trend in required reserve ratios almost guarantees that this second method of soaking up liberated reserves will be employed. Only if banks have absolutely no need for operating balances could an adjusted monetary base continue to be a useful gauge of the money-supply impulse as the downward trend of reserve requirements continues. If there is a positive demand for operating balances, however, reserve requirements eventually will become low enough to be irrelevant. With 88 percent of large banks targeting reserve positions larger than the regulatory requirement, arrival at that point seems imminent.
It is easier to indicate the potential error in these adjusted base measures than it is to suggest a specific, immediate remedy. Unfortunately, factoring clearing balances into a break-or reserve-adjustment magnitude will not be as straightforward as applying today's reserve ratio to yesterday's reservable deposits, or yesterday's reserve ratio to today's reservable deposits. The required ratio of reserve assets to reservable deposits remains constant until an administrative change is announced. The desired ratio of contractual clearing balance to deposits is a behavioral variable. It will evolve over time, much as do the currencyldeposit and transaction/nontransactiondeposit ratios, and is likely to vary with the level of the funds rate.''
Conclusion
The monetary base is defined as the money-supply impulse originating from the stock of central-bank money. Deregulation poses a problem for this definition if it eliminates the demand for central-bank money. Likewise, the definition remains useful as long as there remains a demand for central-bank money with sufficient interest and income elasticities to make central bank monetary policy an "important" influence on all other market outcomes in the economy.
Currency in the hands of the public represents the lion's share of the monetary base. This demand is not in obvious peril from deregulation. True, demand for currency l o This is to be expected. A balance that earns just enough to pay service charges at low interest rates will earn too much at higher rates.
should continue to suffer competitive erosion from the substitution of checks and ACH, credit, debit, and ATM cards, and (it is predicted) from cybermonies and smart cards.
However, more immediately, currency demand has been vastly inflated by foreign users. This is not a definitional problem, but an analytic challenge to distinguish the domestic from the foreign money-supply impulse of the monetary base.
Banks7 demand for central-bank money, on the other hand, has eroded substantially because of deregulation in the form of lower reserve requirements.
Moderating this decline, demands for vault cash and for clearing balances have emerged as important sources of banks' demands for central-bank money. These demands for central-bank money should not dry up as long as banks and the central bank dominate the payments mechanism, for it is the payments function that creates the demand.
Deregulation may not affect the definition of the monetary base, but it already has exposed deficiencies in current measures of the monetary base. Linkages between demand for base money and broader monetary aggregates can be less rigid. Perhaps the base will be more closely linked to the flow of economic activity, but that is sheer speculation. In any case, the determinants of money multipliers and income multipliers should be expected to change.
In the future, measuring a money-supply impulse from changes in the stock of central-bank money is likely to involve more sophisticated models than the somewhat mechanical reserve-adjustment and break-adjustment magnitudes devised in the past.
Both of the available measures employ exaggerated adjustments for changes in reserve requirements. Unfortunately, however, the raw data are collected and presented in an outdated classification framework that precludes the ready estimation of better models.
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